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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Hasan lcanovic appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction 
relief after an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In the underlying criminal case lcanovic pied guilty to felony domestic 
violence pursuant to a plea agreement with the state. (Order Re: Evidentiary 
Hearing Held June 21, 2013, p. 2 (hereinafter "Order").) lcanovic initiated the 
instant case by filing a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 3-5.) lcanovic 
alleged that defense counsel had assured him that his guilty plea would not result 
in his deportation to Bosnia nor result in loss of the ability to apply for United 
States citizenship. (R., pp. 4, 7-8.) lcanovic was a legal permanent resident of 
the United States at the time. (Supp. Tr., p. 80, Ls. 16-19.) 
After an evidentiary hearing 1 the district court found that lcanovic's 
counsel told lcanovic "that if he chose to plead guilty, it was possible he could be 
deported and that there could be adverse impacts on his ability to obtain United 
1 The district court initially granted the state's motion for summary dismissal, 
which the state on appeal conceded was error because there remained material 
issues of fact. (Uncontested Motion for Remand and Statement in Support 
Thereof.) lcanovic's attempt to turn this concession of material issues of fact, 
made in the context of summary dismissal proceedings, into factual or legal 
concessions on remand (Petitioner's Memorandum in re: Padilla v. Kentucky and 
Laffler v. Cooper, p. 4 (augmentation) (claiming motion constituted a stipulation 
to deficient performance); Appellant's brief, p. 17 (state "acknowledged" that only 
issue regarding deficient performance was statutory comparison)), is highly 
inappropriate. The state conceded neither deficient performance nor the 
irrelevance of law guiding the actual deportation proceeding. 
1 
States citizenship." (Order, p. 27.) Furthermore, "during the course of the taking 
of the guilty plea, [the district court] advised Mr. lcanovic that a felony or even a 
misdemeanor conviction could result in his deportation, inability to obtain legal 
status or denial of an application for United States citizenship. Mr. lcanovic 
stated under oath that he understood these potential consequences of pleading 
guilty." (Id. (footnote omitted).) These representations were "legally correct" and 
"factually accurate in light of the relevant statutes, rules, and ICE practices and 
procedures." (Id. at pp. 27-29.) The court therefore found there was neither 
deficient performance of counsel (Order, pp. 26-30) nor prejudice (Order, pp. 31-
33). 
2 
ISSUE 
lcanovic states the issues on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. lcanovic's petition 
for post-conviction relief? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 10.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has lcanovic failed to demonstrate either legal or factual error in the 
district court's order denying his petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
lcanovic Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The District Court's Order Denying 
His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A Introduction 
lcanovic alleged that his counsel informed him that his guilty plea to felony 
domestic violence would not result in his deportation or losing his ability to apply 
for citizenship, and that but for this advice he would not have pied guilty. (R., pp. 
4, 8.) The district court found lcanovic's evidence not credible, the testimony of 
counsel credible, and that lcanovic had in fact been advised both by counsel and 
by the district court that his guilty plea might have immigration consequences. 
(Order, pp. 12, 27.) lcanovic argues that even though he failed to prove his 
allegations he was still entitled to relief, because informing him that he might be 
deported was still ineffective assistance of counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-
25.) lcanovic's argument that the district court should have granted him relief on 
the unpled theory that counsel had informed him that his guilty plea might result 
in his deportation is without merit because counsel's statements were neither 
incorrect nor prejudicial. 2 
2 The state initially argued that Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), should 
not be given retroactive effect. (Brief of respondent, pp. 9-21.) Indeed, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has held that a petitioner whose conviction 
was final prior to the decision in Padilla may not invoke the holding of that case to 
collaterally attack a criminal judgment. Chaidez v. United States,_ U.S. _, 
133 S.Ct. 1103 (2013). In its motion to remand, the state conceded that Padilla 
was decided the day before the judgment in this case became final. 
(Uncontested Motion for Remand and Statement in Support Thereof, p. 3.) 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature and therefore 
the applicant's allegations must be proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence. When appellate review of a district court's denial of 
post-conviction relief follows an evidentiary hearing, rather than a 
summary dismissal, the evidence must be viewed most favorably to 
the trial court's findings. On review, this Court will not disturb the 
district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. 
However, this Court exercises free review of the district court's 
application of the relevant law to the facts. If a district court 
reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, this Court will 
affirm the order upon the correct theory. Additionally, constitutional 
issues are pure questions of law over which this Court exercises 
free review. 
Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, _, 321 P.3d 709, 713 -714 (2014) (internal 
quotes and citations omitted). 
C. lcanovic Failed To Prove Either Deficient Performance Or Prejudice 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner 
must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the petitioner 
was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
88 (1984); Murray, 156 Idaho at_, 321 P.3d at 714. To establish a deficiency, 
the petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Murray, 156 Idaho at_, 321 
P.3d at 714; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); 
Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 442, 163 P.3d 222, 231 (Ct. App. 2007). To 
establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for 
the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different. Murray. 156 Idaho at_, 321 P.3d at 714; Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 442, 
163 P.3d at 231. Where the defendant was convicted upon a guilty plea, to 
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satisfy the prejudice element the claimant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pied guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); 
Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612,621,262 P.3d 255,264 (2011). 
In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010), the Supreme Court of 
the United States held "that counsel must inform her client whether his plea 
carries a risk of deportation." "[W]hen the deportation consequence is truly clear 
... the duty to give correct advice is equally clear," but "[w]hen the law is not 
succinct and straightforward ... a criminal defense attorney need do no more 
than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of 
adverse immigration consequences." kl at 369. In lcanovic's case neither the 
deportation law nor the end result of that process was "succinct and 
straightforward," and therefore counsel's advice that a guilty plea "may carry a 
risk" of deportation was entirely accurate. (Order, pp. 26-29.) Because counsel 
"inform[ed] [his] client" that "his plea carries a risk of deportation," the district 
court correctly found he fulfilled his obligation of reasonableness. 
lcanovic, citing Padilla, claims that counsel has a "duty to give concrete, 
accurate, affirmative advice as to specific immigration consequences," which is 
measured against "whether the federal statutory law makes it clear that the 
particular offense will render the non-citizen client eligible for deportation or 
subject to automatic deportation." (Appellant's brief, p. 16 (emphasis omitted).) 
First, the Supreme Court required no such duty of "concrete, accurate, affirmative 
advice," but only that "his plea carries a risk of deportation." Padilla, 559 U.S. at 
6 
374. Moreover, reading Padilla as holding that a defendant is more interested in 
testing counsel's statutory knowledge than in knowing whether he will actually be 
deported is both unwarranted and strains common sense. Finally, lcanovic's 
laser-like focus on what made him eligible for deportation simply ignores most of 
the applicable deportation law and procedure. 
ICE Officer Brandon Jones testified that after "the individual is found 
removable" by an immigration judge, his "legal permanent residence [sic] status 
is revoked and [he is] kept in ICE custody and we begin trying to obtain travel 
documents for that individual" from the country of origin. (Supp. Tr., p. 73, Ls. 
20-25.) ICE custody can last only up to 180 days. (Supp. Tr., p. 74, Ls. 1-15.) If 
the travel documents are not issued by the country of origin ICE is legally 
"required to release that individual on [his] own recognizance." (Supp. Tr., p. 74, 
Ls. 4-22; see also Supp. Tr., p. 76, Ls. 1-16 (can hold beyond 180 days only if 
immediate removal "highly likely").) If the individual is from a country from which 
ICE cannot obtain travel documents he "would never in effect be removed from 
the United States." (Supp. Tr., p. 84, Ls. 16 - p. 85, L. 14.) Bosnia, lcanovic's 
country of origin, is "tricky" because "verifying citizenship in Bosnia is quite a 
lengthy process." (Supp. Tr., p. 85, L. 15 - p. 86, L. 5.) 
lcanovic's argument assumes that the only relevant step in this process is 
the immigration judge's determination that the individual is removable, and that 
the legal ability to actually remove the individual is irrelevant. This reads Padilla 
too narrowly, and would lead to the absurd result that where the defendant is 
deemed removable by the judge but never actually removed, the attorney who 
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inaccurately advised a client he would be deported would be deemed effective 
while the attorney who accurately predicted the person would not be deported is 
deemed ineffective. lcanovic has not demonstrated that the district court erred 
by concluding lcanovic failed to prove that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
advising him that deportation was a possibility (as opposed to a sure thing) if he 
pied guilty. 
Even if his attorney could theoretically have given better legal advice, his 
advice was, as a matter of fact, spot on, and therefore there can be no prejudice. 
lcanovic had the burden of showing "that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and 
citations omitted). To obtain relief he has to "convince the court that a decision to 
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." 
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)). 
lcanovic's only evidence of prejudice was his assertion that "[b]ut for 
[defense counsel's] advisement, I would not have pied guilty." (R., p. 8.) 
Counsel's alleged "advisement" was that pleading guilty "would not" "result in me 
being deported to Bosnia." (Id.) Thus, the prejudice claim was based on 
underlying facts (an affirmative representation that he would not be deported) 
that the district court specifically rejected. lcanovic presented no evidence that 
the actual advice given by counsel, that pleading guilty might result in 
deportation, played any role whatsoever in lcanovic's decision to accept the plea 
agreement. Because lcanovic presented no evidence suggesting that but for the 
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allegedly erroneous advice that he might be deported he would not have pied 
guilty and would have gone to trial, the district court correctly found no prejudice. 
Moreover, lcanovic has presented no theory by which he would have been 
better off rejecting the state's plea offer and going to trial. He was no less 
subject to deportation after a guilty verdict than after a guilty plea. The district 
court found that the state's charge was backed not only by the victim's testimony, 
but also by physical evidence and the testimony of "an uninvolved third-party 
witness." (Order, pp. 31-32.) The district court concluded that if lcanovic had 
elected to go to trial it is "overwhelmingly likely that he would be in the same, or 
likely a worse, position." (Order, p. 32.) 
lcanovic asserts that no evidence was presented in post-conviction 
regarding what evidence would have been presented at trial had he rejected the 
plea offer. (Appellant's brief, pp., 23-24.) Even assuming the truth of this 
assertion, lcanovic's claim that there is a lack of evidence ultimately cuts against 
him. It was his burden of proof, and there is no evidence that lcanovic had a 
better chance of avoiding deportation had he gone to trial, and therefore no 
evidence that it would have been reasonable to reject the state's plea offer. 
It was lcanovic's burden to prove that he would not have pied guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial but for counsel's deficient performance. On 
appeal he only claims that he proved he "was very concerned about the potential 
immigration consequences of his guilty plea." (Appellant's brief, p. 25.) He can 
cite to no evidence, however, that going to trial would have better addressed this 
concern than pleading guilty. He points out that in his affidavit he claimed he 
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would not have entered the plea. (Id.) His statement that he would not have 
entered the plea but for counsel's advice there would be no deportation is of 
marginal relevance where the facts show the claimed advice was never given. 
lcanovic failed to prove the theory he pied (that he was told there would be no 
immigration consequences) and has failed on appeal to even articulate how he 
was prejudiced by the facts ultimately proved (that he was informed there may be 
immigration consequences). lcanovic has failed to demonstrate that he proved 
any prejudice from the advice in fact given by counsel (and reiterated by the trial 
court). 
The district court found, based on a credibility determination, that counsel 
in fact advised lcanovic that there was the possibility of deportation upon his 
conviction. The district court also informed him of this possibility during the plea 
colloquy. lcanovic does not assert on appeal that the district court erred by 
rejecting his allegations of being told there would be no immigration 
consequences and making these factual findings. These factual findings, in turn, 
show that there was neither deficient performance nor prejudice. lcanovic has 
failed to show error in the district court's order denying his petition for post-
conviction relief. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
and judgment denying the petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 19th day of June, 2014 
KENNETH K. JORG N 
Deputy Attorney Ge eral 
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